This paper investigates how economies with different exchange rate regimes react to changes in US interest rates and in the risk premium attached to their debts in international financial markets. We conduct some event studies, looking at the impact of both interest rate announcement by the US Federal Reseve and of large identifiable shocks to emerging market bond indices, and estimate small vector autorregression systems at the daily and monthly frequencies. Based on the comparison between Hong Kong and Singapore, and to a lesser extent Argentina and Mexico, we find that interest rates in currency board economies react more to shocks in US interest rates than interest rates in comparable floating exchange rate countries. However, we also find that shocks to international risk premia have broadly similar effects regardless of the exchange rate regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate a conventional proposition about exchange rate regimes: that floating exchange rates insulate domestic monetary conditions from international financial shocks because they preserve "monetary independence" for the central bank. In particular, we focus on two types of shocks: changes in the monetary stance of the United States and changes in the risk premia attached to emerging market international bonds. As we will see, we find more empirical support for the proposition with respect to the first type of shock than with respect to the second one.
The highly volatile financial environment of the 1990s challenged the choices of domestic monetary framework that most emerging market economies had made. Many countries had opted for regimes that provided significant exchange rate stability (as an anchor for domestic prices or simply to avoid fluctuations that were considered harmful to international trade) but left some room for current or future changes in the parity. However, most, if not all, of the regimes that succumbed to crises (in the sense of suffering large and sudden depreciations in the value of their currencies) were of this "intermediate" type: pegs without restraining rules on the central banks, bands, or alleged managed floats with very little exchange rate flexibility in practice. It is not surprising that a significant body of opinion focused on "unsustainable pegs" as an important factor leading to the crises. 2 While this incipient consensus tended to favor floating exchange rates, it also recognized that regimes at the other end of the spectrum, namely hard pegs, might be a viable alternative.
The two allegedly viable regimes, at the two extremes of the continuum of exchange rate systems, are radically different, however. The main advantage of floating exchange rate regimes over hard pegs-at least in principle-is that they allow the domestic monetary authority to retain the domestic interest rate as a policy instrument. There is a line of thought, however, that considers that emerging market economies subject to sharp changes in international investor confidence cannot benefit from the use of the interest rate instrument and would in fact be worse off by leaving that possibility open. 3 This "fear of floating" school argues that, because of credibility problems, worries about inflation pass-through, and dollarization in the domestic financial system, central banks sharply curtail movements in the exchange rate even if they officially float. The result is "flexible regimes that are managed as if they were fixed, but without the benefits of precommitment." 4 In sum, the claim is that the benefits of moving to a currency board system or even full dollarization-namely, lower risk premia on both government and private sector liabilities due to a reduced risk of depreciation-are not offset by the costs of reduced flexibility, simply because this flexibility cannot be utilized even in supposedly floating regimes. The tests provided in this paper speak 2 See, among others, Rubin (1999) , Lipton (1999) , Eichengreen (1999) and Goldstein (1999) .
3 Hausmann et al. (1999) , Calvo (2000) , Calvo and Reinhart (1999, 2000) . 4 Hausmann et al. (1999) , page 11.
to the second part of this claim, by addressing the question of how much "insulation" flexible regimes actually provide in practice.
Some recent studies-including Hausmann et al. (1999) , Frankel (1999) and Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000) -have raised doubts on the conventional view on how floating exchange rate regimes work in emerging markets. Hausmann et al. find that the reaction of domestic rates to U.S. rates is insignificantly different across regimes using monthly data from 1960 to 1998 for 11 countries. Moreover, using daily data for 1998-99 for Mexico, Venezuela and Argentina, they find that the reaction of domestic interest rates to the international risk premium is highest for Mexico, the country with the most flexible exchange rate regime. Frankel (1999) regresses quarterly and monthly domestic interest rates in several emerging market countries on the U.S. Federal Funds rate, and concludes that interest rates in countries with floating or intermediate regimes (Mexico after 1994 and Brazil before mid-1998) show much higher interest rate responses than Argentina, Hong Kong, or Panama. Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000) extend these regressions by considering more countries, controlling for currency crisis episodes and inflation differentials, and running panel regressions in addition to regressions for individual countries. Their results are more ambivalent than those of the other authors: using a long sample from 1970-1999, flexible regimes do seem to have an insulating property, in the sense of a smaller reaction of domestic to international interest rates; however, this result goes away when the sample is restricted to the 1990s and developing countries are considered separately. Although these results are suggestive, they raise questions about robustness, in particular to the way in which international interest rate shocks are measured and the regressions are specified. Some of these questions will be taken up in the next section.
In this paper we follow the following strategy. First, we restrict our sample to contrasting Argentina with Mexico in Latin America, and Hong Kong with Singapore in Asia. These economies represent polar choices of exchange rate regimes, which should allow us to detect differences more easily. Moreover, it allows us to bypass the question of how exchange rate regimes should be properly classified, which tends to arise in larger samples. In addition, we run the test for some more advanced, small open economies: Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and for Chile, where, although formally following various forms of preannounced bands for the exchange rate over the sample period, studies of ex-post exchange market conditions indicate a high degree of exchange rate flexibility (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999) . Second, we pay considerable attention to identifying international interest rate shocks in a way that allows a structural interpretation. In particular, we argue that interest rate shocks due to US monetary policy and shocks to emerging market risk premia should not, ex ante, be expected to enter the reaction function of domestic monetary authorities in the same way. As a result, it is important to both distinguish between these two types of shocks, and control for the presence of the other when examining the impact of one on domestic interest rate. Third, we pay attention to short-run dynamics, both because the dynamic response of domestic interest rates to international shocks is itself of interest, and because ignoring these dynamics in a time series context may misspecify the model or raise interpretational difficulties (see next section for details). Finally, we try to test for robustness by looking at different measures of domestic interest rates and US monetary policy shocks.
We conduct two types of tests. First, we conduct an event study that focuses on specific US monetary policy actions, identified by changes in the federal funds rate target, and measure their impact on domestic interest rates and exchange rates of the countries in our sample. We also conduct an analogous study that looks at the reactions to large shocks to emerging market risk premia associated with identifiable events (for example, the run on Hong Kong, or the Russian default). Second, we run vector autoregressions at the daily frequency, using four-variable VARs that include domestic interest rates, exchange rates, a measure for U.S. interest rate policy, and a measure of emerging market risk premia, and vector autoregressions at the monthly frequency, which use these variables plus some additional domestic controls (money, prices and output). Based on these VARs, we compute impulse response functions to both U.S. monetary policy shocks and emerging market risk shocks.
Our main results are as follows. First, floating regimes do not seem to have appreciable benefits in insulating emerging market economies from shocks to emerging market risk premia. Specifically, the reaction of Mexican interest rates to such shocks is at about as large about the same size-and sometimes larger-than that of Argentinian interest rates, and neither Singapore nor Hong Kong react much to these types of shocks (except duringthe Asia crisis). However, this finding cannot be easily attributed to "fear of floating", as the reactions of Mexican exchange rates to shocks to risk premia is also very large. Second, floating exchange rates do seem to have a role in insulating economies from shocks to U.S. interest rates, in line with conventional beliefs. Specifically, interest rates in Hong Kong seem to react one-for-one to U.S. monetary policy shocks, while the short-run reaction of interest rates in Singapore to a 1 basis point shock in the U.S. is about 0.3, along with a significant depreciation in the exchange rate. The VAR-based results tentatively suggest a similar finding for the comparison between Argentina and Mexico, however, this is much less conclusive, largely because of imprecise estimates for Mexico.
II. METHODOLOGY
The empirical approach adopted in this paper has three main characteristics: first, a focus on impact reaction and short run dynamics following an international interest rate shock; second, the distinction between shocks attributable to U.S. monetary policy and shocks to emerging market risk premia; and third, the approach used to identify the two types of external shocks latter two. We discuss these in turn.
A. Dynamic Specification
To organize thoughts, consider the standard risk-augmented uncovered interest rate parity condition: Suppose that ρ and r* are exogenous. Then, the impact of a shock to ρ or r* on the domestic interest rate will depend on how the shock affects exchange rate expectations. Under a hard peg, ] [ e e E & = 0 by definition, so that an increase in ρ or r* affects r one-for-one.
In contrast, in the traditional view, an increase in r* or ρ under floating exchange rates will lead to an instantaneous depreciation of the exchange rate which, for a given long-run value for the exchange rate, will reduce the expected rate of depreciation from that point on, and thus imply that r increases less than one-for-one with r*. In the extreme, when the money supply, output and prices are fixed in the short run, r should not react at all, as is the case in the basic Dornbusch overshooting model. Over the long run, however, the assumptions of a fixed money supply, long-run neutrality of money and a fixed long run real exchange rate imply that the nominal exchange rate will eventually revert to its steady-state level, at which point ] [ e e E & = 0, and r must adjust one-for-one with r*.
It follows that a simple contemporaneous regression of domestic interest rates on international interest rates using time series data-i.e., ignoring any short-run dynamics, as captured by lags of r, r* and ρ -is probably not a good approach to testing the conventional view. Suppose first that r* and ρ are stationary. Then, the coefficients in a simple levels regression in r , r* and ρ would be interpreted as reflecting the impact reaction of r* and ρ on domestic interest rates. However, the movement of r in any given period should depend not only on the contemporaneous movements of r* and ρ but on its out-of-equilibrium position at in that period. This could easily bias the estimated contemporaneous reaction: for example, over a period where international interest have been rising, one would expect to see a positive co-movement of r and r* on the grounds of delayed adjustment of r to previous increases in r* , even if the contemporaneous reaction of r to shocks to r* was in fact zero. Next, suppose that r* and/orρ are integrated, so that equation (1) describes a co-integrating relationship between r* (and/or ρ ) and r. Then, the coefficients in a simple levels regression in r , r* and ρ would be interpreted as reflecting the long run relationship between r* and domestic interest rates. In that case, consistent estimation would not be an issue; however, it is no longer clear that the exchange rate regime should make any difference to the relationship between r and r*. With long-run neutrality, one would expect a one-for-one relationship, regardless of the regime.
The conclusion is that testing the insulating properties of floating exchange rate regimes using time-series data is likely to require a full dynamic specification, in the sense of allowing for lags in the dependent variable, r* and ρ . Alternatively, if one is willing to restrict attention to the impact effect of shocks to r* and ρ on domestic interest rates, it would be acceptable to focus on the immediate reaction of interest rates to exogenous events that lead to changes in r* or ρ , using high frequency (daily) data, so that delayed reactions of r through the adjustment of money, output or prices to previous shocks to r* or ρ are not an issue. In this paper, we pursue both approaches, as described in more detail below.
B. Shocks to International Interest Rates Versus Shocks to Risk Premia
In our regressions below, we include both a measure of international interest rates, r* in the previous notation, and of emerging market risk premia, ρ . One reason is that since the two variables are quite possibly correlated, one needs to control for movements of one when estimating the effect of the other. In addition, there are a-priori reasons to believe that the insulating property of floating exchange rate regimes, if it exists at all, could differ depending on the origin of the shock. Specifically, one might expect floating regimes to be less successful in cushioning the impact of shocks to risk premia than to shocks to r*, for several reasons.
First, unlike shocks to r*, shocks to risk premia are not necessarily exogenous to the country. For example, they are likely to be correlated with domestic shocks to output.
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In estimating the effect changes in ρ on r, one can mitigate this problem by using a measure of ρ which reflects average emerging market risk premia rather than country-specific premia, and this is the approach taken in the regressions below. However, in the presence of contagion through international asset markets, which implies that adverse shocks in any one country might be instantaneously reflected in emerging markets spreads more generally, the possibility remains that some movements in ρ might be endogenous to domestic variables.
Second, arguments that monetary authorities in emerging market countries may be reluctant to let the exchange rate adjust in response to an external shock would generally seem to apply with greater force for shocks to ρ than for shocks to r*. One such argument, stressed by Calvo and Reinhart (2000) , is that the monetary authorities in emerging market countries are unlikely to let the exchange rate go at times when they are cut-off from international capital markets, because depreciations may have contractionary effects in such times. 6 Another argument focuses on non-linearities in the effect of a currency depreciation on output. This may arise from credibility and reputation issues, as also argued by Calvo and Reinhart
The predictions of the simple Dornbusch model for the effect of a combined shock to ρ and Y are quite different, as these shocks would lead to an instantaneous jump in r as well as e, as domestic money demand changes on impact. The basic intuition is that devaluations generally have both an income effect, which tends to reduce the demand for home goods and thus aggregate demand and a substitution effects, which works in the opposite direction. The less a country can borrow from abroad after a devaluation, the stronger the impact from the first of the two channels.
(2000), among others: 7 a large depreciation may be a bad signal about the domestic authorities' willingness to keep future inflation under control, and thus make future inflation control more difficult and perhaps invite further outflows. Allowing the exchange rate to depreciate following a ρ -shock may create a bigger credibility problem than an exchange rate adjustment after a r*-shock, for several reasons: ρ might not be generally observable while r* is, or shocks in ρ might simply be larger on average, requiring a larger depreciation that raises eyebrows, while shocks to r* do not.
A third story, that gained much prominence after the Asian crises, focuses on multiple equilibria arising from dollar-denominated liabilities, as argued informally by Fischer (1998) and more formally by Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000) and Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) . In the presence of dollar-denominated corporate debt, the economy could either be in an equilibrium where the exchange rate is appreciated, debt service burdens are low, and future output is high, and in an equilibrium with a depreciated exchange rate, high debt burden, and low output. Shocks to either r* or ρ could cause a switch from the good to the bad equilibrium if either (1) the resulting depreciation is so large that it removes the good equilibrium, or (2) they trigger a shift in expectations. However, ρ -shocks appear more dangerous on both counts, since they tend to be much larger, on average; and since contagion during the Tequila, Asia and Russia crises suggests that they influence investor sentiment vis à vis emerging markets to a much greater extent than U.S. interest rate shocks. Thus, depreciation following ρ -shocks is more likely to be resisted by policy-makers.
Consequently, we view it as important to examine the effects of r*-shocks and ρ -shocks separately. This will enable us to test whether there is any difference in the extent to which floating regimes isolate domestic interest rates from the two types of shocks.
C. Identifying Shocks to International Interest Rates
Most of the existing empirical literature-in particular, Hausmann et al. (1999) and Frankel, Schmukler and Servén (2000) -use U.S. market interest rates (90-day T-bill or LIBOR US$ rates) to measure international interest rates. This choice can be defended on the following grounds. First, in the traditional view, floating exchange rates should help insulate domestic interest rate with respect to any movement in international interest rates, regardless of whether this is driven by money demand or money supply shocks. Second, since domestic financial markets are small relative to the U.S. money market, it is fair to assume that U.S. Tbill rates are exogenous, or at the very least contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term, in the context of a regression of domestic rates on international rates. However, the second argument is not quite as obvious as it seems at first. While the small size of domestic financial markets in emerging market countries makes it unlikely that reserve causality is an issue, there may be common shocks that affect both U.S. and domestic interest rates, leading to a potential endogeneity problem. Two examples that come to mind are: (1) shocks to emerging market risk premia that have a "safe haven" effect, i.e. prompt a flight into U.S. instruments; (2) shocks related to U.S. activity (for example, unexpectedly high quarterly growth figures) that affect both U.S. interest rates and domestic interest rates directly, through an expectation of higher domestic growth. Ceteris paribus, the first channel would tend to bias the estimated effect of U.S. interest rates on domestic interest rates down; while the second channel would tend to bias it up.
On ex-ante grounds, these issues may not seem a major problem-particularly when controlling for changes in emerging market risk premia, which would largely take care of point (1). However, much of the interest in the insulating effect of floating regimes comes arises from the question whether floating exchange rates in emerging markets allow the monetary authorities to control of domestic interest rates independently of U.S. monetary policy. If this is the case, one might as well try interest rate measures that only reflect shocks arising from U.S. monetary policy. This allows for a clearer interpretation of the results, and at the same time takes care of at least some of the potential endogeneity problems associated with the use of U.S. market interest rates.
There are several ways in which such measures can be constructed, depending on whether one merely wishes to identify the policy surprise associated with particular monetary policy event, such a change in the Federal Funds rate target, or whether one requires a time series which assigns a policy surprise measure to each period:
(1) In the context of monthly time series data, one can run a VAR of the type that are used to identify the monetary policy shocks and their effects on the U.S. economy (for example, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) or Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) ), and save the orthogonalized residuals to the U.S. monetary policy variable (typically either the federal funds rate or non-borrowed reserves). Alternatively, one can construct a measure of U.S. monetary policy surprises directly from observed changes in federal funds futures rates oras suggested by Rudebusch (1998) -from the difference between average daily federal funds rates in a given month and the one-month ahead federal funds futures rate on the last day of the previous month. The federal funds futures rate is based on a futures contract that calls for delivery of interest paid on a principal amount of $5 million in overnight funds. Payments are made whenever the futures contract settlement price changes during the contract month. This, in turn, is calculated based on the arithmetic average of the daily effective federal funds rate reported by the Fed for each day of the contract (calendar) month. This implies that the one-month ahead Federal Funds futures rate will represent the market expectation of the average federal funds rate during the next full calendar month; the two-month federal funds rate the market (continued…) (2) In the context of daily time series data, VAR-based identification of U.S. monetary policy shocks is not possible since this requires monthly or quarterly data, but one can still construct measures of daily policy surprises on the basis of federal funds futures rates, as explained in more detail in the empirical section.
(3) Finally, to identify the surprise content of a particular change in the federal funds target, one can again use federal funds futures data (for example, the difference in the same-month federal funds futures rate, adjusted by the proportion of days remaining in the month, as suggested by Kuttner (2000) , or related measures based on 2 and 3-month ahead futures contracts, see below). Alternatively, following Skinner and Zettelmeyer (1995) , one could also use the jump in the U.S. three-month T-bill rate on the day of the policy announcement: for days on which there were no other major news that might have influenced the influenced the three-month T-Bill market, these would constitute a set of international interest rate shocks attributable to U.S. monetary policy.
D. Empirical Approach
The approach taken in this paper is as follows. First, we use both U.S. monetary policy surprise measures based on federal funds futures rates-to be defined more precisely in the empirical sections below-and alternatively, following the earlier literature, the three month U.S. T-Bill rate. We do not attempt to estimate monthly monetary policy shocks via a U.S. VAR , mainly because the resulting series is in turn sensitive to the identification assumptions used in the U.S. VAR, and because constructed regressors are statistically less straightforward to handle than market-based variables. Second, we estimate the reaction of domestic interest rates to U.S. monetary policy surprises both by looking at the average reaction of domestic interest rates to surprises associated with specific U.S. policy events, and by estimating VARs based on either daily or monthly data. The latter has the advantage that it enables us to compare dynamic paths, rather than just instantaneous responses, and that it enables us to use a much richer dataset.
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The former, however, is much more likely to produce a measure that truly reflects exogenous policy shocks, as supposed to just policy surprises. The main difference is that time-series measures of policy surprises will react not expectation of the average federal funds rate during the calendar month after that, etc. For details, see Carlson, McIntire and Thomson (1994). 9 This is true both because there were only 45 changes in the Federal Funds rate target from 1989 until mid-2000 (see Appendix I for details), and because the information content of these events is relatively small, since many were highly anticipated (particularly after 1994, when the Fed almost always changed the target on FOMC meetings that were scheduled in advance). Moreover, not all events can be used for all countries because of either data problems in the domestic interest rate variable (Argentina), or because of changes in the exchange rate regime (Mexico).
only to monetary policy shocks-i.e. the random component of the policy reaction function-but to announcements of economic variables that affect monetary policy-i.e. unexpected changes in the systematic component of the policy reaction function. This may conceivably create an endogeneity problem, as argued before (although much less so than if the same measure were used for the purposes of gauging the impact of monetary policy on U.S. economic variables). In contrast, the monetary surprise associated with a fed announcement on a given day is a sure measure of the shock associated with that announcement, unless there are other economic news on the same day to which the fed announcement may have been endogenous (for example, labor statistics). However, these are relatively rare occurrences, which can be identified and eliminated from the sample based on contemporaneous press reports (see Skinner and Zettelmeyer (1995) for details).
Finally, consider the measurement of emerging market risk premia. As briefly mentioned in the previous subsection, it is not advisable to use spreads on dollar-denominated bonds of the same country to measure these, since these are likely to be correlated with country-specific shocks which would be expected to affect domestic interest rates even in the textbook case of flexible exchange rates. Thus, we require a measure that reflects emerging market risk in general. There are not many choices here: the only such measure that is available since the early 1990s at the daily frequency is the average spread on sovereign bonds entering J.P. Morgan's Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI). The disadvantage of using this measure is that the endogeneity problem associated with the use of country-specific spreads still exists, albeit in weaker form, to the extent that the bonds of the country we are considering are still part of the index.
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For this reason, we pursue a two-track approach, just as in the context of identifying U.S. monetary policy shocks. On the one hand, we run monthly and daily VARs that include the Emerging Market Bond Index; however, unlike the measure representing U.S. monetary policy, this is treated as an endogenous variable. On the other, we look at the response of domestic interest rates to large shocks attributable to specific events, where the event set is adapted slightly for each country to exclude domestic shocks. For example, the run on Hong Kong in October of 1997 is part of the sample of events used to examine interest responses in Argentina and Mexico, but not in Hong Kong itself. This enables us to compare the reactions of domestic interest rates to shocks in risk premia that are truly due to "foreign" causes.
III. RESULTS

A. Impact Reactions to U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks
We start out by comparing immediate reactions of domestic interest rates to U.S. monetary policy for the five emerging market and three advanced economies mentioned in the 10 In principle, one could address this by removing the spreads of the country bonds in question from the emerging market average. Unfortunately, however, the weights used to compute the index change daily depending on market volume, and are not publicly available.
introduction. U.S. monetary policy shocks are identified in three ways: (1) the change in 3 month U.S. T-Bill rate in reaction to a (publicly announced or at least publicly understood) change in the federal funds target, (2) Kuttner's (2000) measure of monetary policy surprises based on the reaction of the same-month federal fund futures rate to the policy action; (3) an analogous measure based on the reaction of a weighted average of the two-month ahead and three-month ahead federal funds futures rate rate, which we dub "FF2CONT", and which is described in detail in the appendix. The latter measure captures not only the policy surprise associated with the meeting itself, but also the impact of the meeting on expectations about monetary policy actions in meetings over the next 2-3-months, which corresponds to the maturity of the interest rate data we typical use on the left hand side.
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In practice, all three measures of policy are highly correlated (see Appendix Table A1 ). Figures 1a through 1d use the change in FF2CONT as our preferred measure, but the regressions that follow are based on all three.
Consider first Figures 1a and 1b , which compare the reactions of interest rates and exchange rates to U.S. monetary policy shocks for the three advanced economies, Hong Kong and Singapore. The horizontal axis of each plot shows U.S. monetary policy shocks. In the plots on the left column, the vertical axis shows the change of a domestic interest rate on the same dates (adjusted for the time difference in the case of the Pacific markets); 12 in the plots on the right column, it shows the percentage change in the exchange rate (were a depreciation is defined as an increase). In general, we picked the most liquid money market rate of approximately three months maturity that was available at the daily frequency during the 1990s (see Appendix 2 for details about the data).
The main insights from Figures 1a and 1b are as follows. First, all countries show positive correlations between both domestic interest movements and U.S. monetary policy shocks, and (with the obvious exception of Hong Kong) exchange rate changes and U.S. shocks. Perhaps surprisingly, the correlation between domestic interest rates and U.S. shocks appears somewhat tighter than that between exchange rates and U.S. shocks. Second, the reaction of interest rates in Hong Kong appears substantially larger than for the other countries. These results seem broadly consistent with conventional priors for industrial countries: in small open economies with floating regimes, one would expect monetary authorities (particularly if they target inflation) to partially "lean against" nominal exchange rate appreciations or 11 For example, suppose that an interest rate hike is expected with some probability for either today's meeting or the next meeting (but not for both). If the hike materializes today, then Kuttner's measure will only pick up the shock associated with today's action, while FF2CONT will pick up the sum of today's shock and the revision of expectations for the next meeting, in the opposite direction. In other words, for Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, the dates were moved forward by one day to take account of the fact that a date t announcement in Washington would impact these markets at date t+1.
depreciations. This would generate a positive correlation between domestic and international interest rate movements, but obviously less so than in the case of a currency board regime. Note, that the emerging markets floater in our sample-Singapore-seems to behave no differently from the three industrial countries. Figures 1c and 1d , which show analogous plots for the three Latin American countries in the sample. For Argentina, a liquid money market rate is only available beginning in 1997, which would have rendered the sample too short. Consequently, we used two alternative interest rates: a 90-day deposit rate which exists consistently since 1993, and yields on longer term domestic government bonds (PRE1) that have a liquid market.
Consider next
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To deal with the time zone difference-which implies that U.S. announcements may sometimes have arrived after markets closed in Argentina-as well as possible stickiness in the Argentinian deposit rate, we show the change of domestic interest rates both over the same dates as for the US t-bill rate (i.e. t minus t-1, where t indicates the day of the US announcement), and an extended the time window to give the domestic rate one extra day to react (i.e., t+1 minus t-1). For Mexico, we use a treasury-bill type rate, the 91 day secondary market CETES rate, which occasionally has missing data points, and does not appear to be very liquid over some subperiods; for these reasons, we show Mexican CETES reactions for a one-day and two-day window, as in the case of Argentina. Finally, for Chile, we used a 90-365 day time deposit rate provided by the central bank. The contracts underlying this rate are not expressed in nominal domestic currency units but instead in an inflation-indexed currency unit, the "unidad de fomento" (UF) (a liquid money market in nominal currency units did not exist in Chile over most of the sample period). For the purpose of measuring daily reactions, however, this is almost as good as a nominal instrument since the day-to-day changes in the value of the UF relative to the Chilean peso are very small. Figure 1c shows that the correlation of the Chilean domestic interest rates with U.S. rates is about the same as for the industrial countries and Singapore, although there appears to be no correlation with the exchange rate. For Mexico, the correlation of the exchange rate seems about in line with that of the industrial countries, but the correlation of domestic interest rates appears much larger (note the difference in the scale of the vertical axis). Interestingly, the correlation for Argentina is of about the same order of magnitude (except for the 90-day deposit rate in conjunction with the 1-day window, which we can disregard for the reasons stated earlier). Thus, at first sight, Mexico's floating exchange rate regime does not appear to "buy" Mexico a smaller sensitivity of interest rate responses to U.S. interest rate shocks relative to Argentina. Note, however, that this impression is based on very few datapoints, since we have no reliable interest rate data for Argentina prior to 1993, and that the floating 13 The PRE1 ("Previsional 1") bond was issued to settle debts with pensioners with an original maturity of 8 years, and is actively traded by domestic and foreign investors. A similar, PRE2, bond was issued in dollars. The remaining maturity of these bonds, of course, declines steadily over our sample. regime for Mexico only started in 1995. Also, note that the interest rate correlations for both Mexico and Argentina may be driven by just one or two outliers.
The regression results give a better sense of the magnitude and statistical significance of the correlations suggested by the plots, as well as of the robustness to excluding outliers. Table1a shows simple univariate static regressions of domestic interest rate changes on U.S. monetary policy shocks occurring on the same day, using three alternative measures for the U.S. Since no systematic change in interest rates would be expected in the absence of an international interest rate shock, the regression constant was suppressed; however, if a constant is allowed this is usually insignificant, and all the main results go through. Table 1b shows analogous regressions for the exchange rate, this time with a regression constant to allow for a trend depreciation.
The results mostly confirm the preceding discussion, which can be summarized in four points:
(i) The sensitivity of domestic interest rates to U.S. policy shocks is remarkably similar for the three industrial countries, Singapore and Chile. In all cases, a one basis point U.S. policy shock leads to a change of about 0.3 to 0.4 basis points in the domestic interest rate. This relationship is statistically significant for all countries except Chile.
(ii) For Hong Kong, interest rates rise about one-for-one with U.S. policy, in line with a textbook model of a currency board regime.
(iii) For Argentina and Mexico, interest rate responses are much higher than one-for-one, and in the same order of magnitude, despite the differences in their regimes. However, these results are highly sensitive to outliers. After dropping outliers, the estimated coefficients are smaller (although generally still larger than one), and insignificantly different from zero. Thus, the results for Argentina and Mexico are not conclusive based on this sample.
(iv) Finally, the results also confirm the expected positive response of exchange rates to U.S. interest rate shocks for the floating regimes, although the coefficients are not always statistically significant. This time, the coefficient for Mexico appears more or less in line with that for the other floaters in the sample.
B. Impact Reactions to Large Shocks in Emerging Market Risk Premia
We now examine the reactions of domestic interest rates and exchange rates to large movements in emerging market risk premia. To define a suitable set of "events", we proceeded as follows. First, we identified all days on which J.P. Morgan's "EMBI Global" composite bond index moved by at least 3 percent. The EMBI Global is a broad-based index of emerging market bond prices which exists since January 1994. The 3-percent threshold is sufficiently high such that the financial press would usually notice and attempt to interpret the "jump" in emerging market bonds; however, it is still sufficiently low to yield a reasonably-sized event set (40 events in the period between January 1994 and mid-2000, see Appendix Table A2 ). Second, the background to each event was checked using back issues of the Financial Times, in particular with a view to identifiying the market or markets in which the shock originated. This turned out to be relatively easy in all but two cases. Finally, for each country, we examined the reaction of domestic interest rates to the shocks, both on the entire sample and-to disentangle the effect of domestic and international shocksexcluding the shocks that appear to have "originated" in the country or in a neighboring country with strong real linkages (in particular, Brazil for the case of Argentina). Shocks were measured as the change in the EMBI spread over the day. For Argentina and Mexico, where dollar-denominated sovereign bond yields are available over the entire sample period, we also examined the reaction of domestic interest rates to the change in the dollardenominated bond yield on that date (the idea being that the latter is likely to be a better measure of how the international shock affects the country-specific risk premium).
Figures 2a-c plot changes in domestic interest rate and (if applicable) the exchange rates against the full sample of 40 large changes in the EMBI spread. Table 2 shows regression results both for the full sample and for the subsample of events that are deemed exogenous for each country. As it turns out, this distinction usually does not matter much, but there are some exceptions (notably, Argentina, for which Figure 2b shows scatterplots on both the full and the reduced sample). The main results are as follows.
Taking the two Asian countries first, note that a small but significant and robust reaction of interest rates to EMBI shocks is apparent for Hong Kong (coefficient of about 0.25), but not for Singapore, where the corresponding coefficient is insignificant (and in fact negative). This accords with conventional priors about the potentially insulating effects of Singapore's exchange rate regime. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the behavior of Singapore's exchange rate, which also shows no significant reaction to EMBI shocks, and sometimes has the wrong sign. Thus, the evidence might simply indicate that Hong Kong is much more vulnerable to international investors' sentiment.
For Mexico and Argentina, one observes virtually the same reaction of the interest rates to EMBI shocks (with a coefficient of around 1), but only if (1) the PRE-1 rate is used for Argentina (domestic deposit rates, which are not shown in the figures and tables, show very little response); and (2) events originating in Argentina or Brazil are removed from the sample for Argentina. 14 Thus, there is no evidence that the floating exchange rate regime 14 On closer inspection, it turns out that the latter hinges on just one outlier for Argentina, namely the sharp drop in the EMBI spread on January 15, 1999, when emerging markets and particularly Brady bonds recovered from an initial over-reaction to the Brazil devaluation two days earlier. While Argentinian Brady bonds followed the general trend toward lower spreads, the PRE-1 did not, and the yield on the PRE-1 rose sharply. A possible interpretation is that at this point markets may have realized that the crisis was under control and the real would stabilize at the depreciated level. While reducing the chance of a further deepening of the Brazilian crisis, this my have increased doubts about the sustainability of the exchange rate regime in Argentina.
helped insulate Mexico from EMBI shocks. Interestingly, however, this finding cannot easily be attributed to "fear of floating", as the Mexican exchange rate did in fact exhibit very large, significant responses to EMBI shocks. If anything, the results seem in line with a stylized fact in advanced open economies, namely that the increase in exchange rate volatility associated with floating exchange rate regimes is not necessarily offset by a reduction in volatility elsewhere in the domestic economy.
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In our case, Mexican interest rates seem at least as volatile as interest rates in Argentina.
Finally, for Chile as well as the three industrial countries, the response of interest rates to the large EMBI shocks is positive but small and generally not significant (the exception is Canada, but this turns out to be driven by an outlier, namely the sharp hike of Canadian interest rates on August 27, 1998 in response to turmoil on international financial markets which led to an attack on the Canadian dollar). Note, however, that there appears to be a higly significant reaction of the Canadian exchange rate to EMBI shocks, which may be related to the fact that the Canadian dollar came under heavy attack particularly during the Tequila crisis, which did not affect Australia or New Zealand.
C. Vector Autoregressions Based on Daily Data
We now show the results from a set of country-specific vector autoregressions, using daily data, in the variables FF2CONT as measure of U.S. monetary policy, the EMBI spread, the natural logarithm of the exchange rate (when applicable) and the corresponding domestic interest rate. Identification is achieved by imposing this ordering on the contemporaneous relationship, i.e. by assuming that FF2CONT contemporaneously affects all other variables but is not itself affected by any of them, that the EMBI spread is contemporaneously only affected by FF2CONT but affects the other two, and so forth. In addition, we test, accept, and impose full exogeneity of FF2CONT. Note that the results that follow are not sensitive to changes in the relative ordering of exchange rates and domestic interest rates or to using the alternative U.S. policy measures shown in Tables 1a and 1b. One can view the impulse response functions generated from these VARs as an extension of the impact regressions presented earlier, where we now use a much broader dataset, consider short-run dynamics in addition to static responses, control for the presence of EMBI shocks in the estimation of the effects of U.S. policy shocks and vice versa, and take into account dynamic endogeneity of all variables except our proxy for U.S. policy shocks. The main downside, as explained in detail in the methodology section, is that the identification of the underlying shocks is less clean than in the previous section. In the case of EMBI shocks with regard to Mexico and Argentina, which are contained in the EMBI with substantial weights, endogeneity may be an important issue. To deal with this problem in at least a rudimentary fashion, we excluded subperiods from the sample in which there is a presumption that the 15 See in particular, Flood and Rose (1995) . Related results are presented in Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Jeanne and Rose (2000) . EMBI might be driven by domestic shocks affecting the country whose interest rate we are examining; thus, the sample used in the regressions for Mexico begins in June of 1995, and the samples for Hong Kong and Singapore do not include the period after July 1997. As it turns out, the impulse response functions to EMBI shocks are entirely consistent with the results from the impact regressions, lending some credibility to the identification assumptions made.
Short run effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks
Figures 3a through 3c display impulse response functions for both domestic interest rates and exchange rates with respect to a one percentage point shock to U.S. interest rates. Beginning again with the industrial countries in order to define a "baseline" with which to compare the results for the emerging markets, the main results are summarized as follows.
• For Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the results are in line with conventional expectations, and broadly consistent with those of the previous section. Roughly speaking, a 1 basis point shock leads to a 0.5 basis point interest pass through and a 0.2 percent depreciation on impact. As in the previous section, the responses of interest rates are estimated much more tightly than the exchange rate responses, which are statistically significant in only one case (Canada).
• For Singapore, the interest rate reaction is more or less in line with that of the industrialized countries (0.2-0.4 basis points on impact for a 1 bp shock, later rising to about 0.6). For Hong Kong, the response is approximately three times as large: about 1 basis point on impact, later rising to about 1.5. Note also the significant response of exchange rates in the case of Singapore. In sum, a foreign interest rate shock seems to be reflected one-for-one (or even slightly more than one-for-one) in Hong-Kong interest rates, whereas in the case of Singapore it seems to be absorbed by interest rates and exchange rates in about equal proportion.
• In the cases of Argentina, Mexico, and Chile, the estimation results are much noisier and thus harder to compare. For Argentina, the results again show a consistent, significant over-reaction of the interest rate on impact, roughly 1-3 basis points per basis point of U.S. shock. The estimated impact effect on Mexican interest rates appears smaller, but the standard errors are too large to reach a definite conclusion.
Short run effects of EMBI shocks
Next, consider impulse responses with respect to a one percentage point shock to the EMBI spread (Figures 4a through 4c) . In interpreting these results, it is important to keep in mind that the typical EMBI shock is about ten times larger than the typical U.S. interest rate shock (the standard deviation of the orthogonalized error is about 2.6 basis points for the latter, and 28 basis points for the former). Thus, relative to the standard volatility of both measures, a one percentage point EMBI shock represents a much smaller shock than a one percentage point U.S. interest rate shock. The results are summarized as follows:
• All three industrialized countries show some response to EMBI shocks (in terms of both interest rates and exchange rates). However, these are very small for Australia and New Zealand. For Canada, the estimated effect on interest rates is somewhat larger: alpproximately a 4 basis point increase for a 100 basis point jump in the EMBI spread.
The relatively large effect for Canada may be driven by "contagion" during the Tequila crisis.. • Hong Kong shows no significant reaction to EMBI shocks. For Singapore, the reaction appears to be negative, i.e. if anything points to a "safe haven" effect. Recall that these reactions were estimated on a sample that stops in July 1997, i.e. excludes the Asia crisis. When re-estimating the VARs for the late 90s only, including the Asian and Russian crises, the results for Hong Kong shows a significant reaction to the EMBI in the expected direction; however, the effects remain small. Singapore appears unaffected even when the Asia crisis period is included in the regression.
• Not surprisingly, all three Latin American countries exhibit significant reactions to EMBI shocks. The point estimates suggests an "overreaction" of about 1.5:1 for Mexico and about 2:1 for Argentina (however, because of the potential endogeneity, these results should perhaps be taken with more caution than the point estimates of the event studies which suggested reactions in the order of 1:1 for both). Note again that the large reaction of the Mexican interest rate occurs in spite of a large, significant response of the exchange rate (about 1.5 percent depreciation in response to a 100 basis point EMBI shock). Chile seems much less sensitive to EMBI shocks than Argentina and Mexico, both in terms of interest rate pass through and in terms of exchange rate fluctuations.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the EMBI itself shows a large, significant response with respect to U.S. monetary policy shocks, of more than one for one (not shown).
D. Vector Autoregressions Based on Monthly Data
We also ran a set of VAR's based on monthly data. This allows us to use a richer specification, which in addition to the variables used in the monthly VAR includes a monthly proxy for domestic activity (typically, industrial production), money and the CPI. For the purposes of identification, the ordering of these variables was (1) the 2-months ahead federal funds futures rate as a U.S. monetary policy proxy; (2) the EMBI spread, (3) log money, (4) log industrial production, (5) log of the CPI (6) the exchange rate (when applicable) and (7) interest rates. Again, results are neither sensitive to changes in the ordering between variables (3) - (7) nor to the use of the U.S. 3-months T-Bill rate instead of the 2-months ahead federal funds futures rate.
The main motivation for running monthly VARs is to see whether the effects detected so far are relevant beyond the very short run. The disadvantage is that identifying shocksparticularly U.S. policy shocks-becomes even more difficult. A problem that arises when at the monthly frequency but not at the daily frequency is that we may be picking up unexpected movements in output which might be correlated across countries due to the synchronization of business cycles, and which we do not fully control for. To the extent that monetary policy both in the U.S. and the domestic economy react to these changes, this might generate a correlation between interest rate movements that does not reflect the reaction of domestic interest rates to U.S. policy shocks, but rather the endogenous reaction (via the monetary policy reaction function) of both U.S. interest rates and domestic interest rates to common shocks.
Note that the average size of the innovations is much larger at the monthly frequency than at the daily frequency, reflecting the persistence of daily shocks to interest rates and exchange rates. Thus, the 1 percentage point shock for which the impulse responses are again drawn is now closer in size to shocks that one would actually observe in practice at the monthly frequency. At this frequency, a standard deviation shock for the EMBI is about 100 basis points, while it is about 13 basis points for US interest rates. Note that, again, the typical EMBI shock is almost ten times as large as the typical US interest rate shock.
Effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks
The following summarizes the main results from the impulse responses shown in Figures 5a through 5c.
• For Australia, Canada, New Zealand, interest rate reactions to a 1 point US interest rate shocks are now larger on impact-0.5 to 0.6 points. At the 12-24 month horizon, the reaction is closer to 1 for 1, as one would expect with long-run neutrality of money, i.e. if the insulating effect of an exchange rate depreciation is temporary. This result is in line with the findings of Frankel, Schmukler and Servén. Except in the case of Canada, we did not pick up much of an exchange rate reaction, and even there only in the short run (1-3 months.
• The contrast between Hong Kong and Singapore is less pronounced than at the daily frequency frequency. On impact, the impact response of Hong Kong is still about twice as large (about 0.6 versus 0.3), but the difference with respect to Singapore quickly shrinks and is briefly reversed after about three months. U.S. shocks seem to have a more persistent effect on Hong Kong than Singapore, but it is not clear how this would be related to the differences between the two monetary arrangements. As in the case of Canada, any significant reaction of Singapore's exchange rate to U.S. shocks is limited to the short term (1-3 months).
• Estimates for Argentina, Mexico and Chile are again noisy and harder to compare. For
Chile we can at least say that the order of magnitude of the interest rate response seems about the same as that of Singapore and the industrialized countries, while the reaction of the exchange rate is insignificantly different from zero (at the short end; at the longer end it has the "wrong" sign). In contrast, the interest rate response for Argentina again exhibits a large overreaction, at least after a few months. The magnitude of this overreaction seems even larger than was the case in the daily VARs. Finally, for Mexico we do not pick up any significant response, but this may be due to an extremely imprecise estimation.
Effects of EMBI shocks
Figures 6a through 6c show impulse response functions with respect to a one percentage point change in the EMBI. Unlike the previous set of impulse responses with respect to policy shocks, the basic qualitative findings are almost the same as for the analogous exercise based on daily VARs, and the same caveats apply with respect to endogeneity.
• For the industrialized economies, the effects are again generally significant, but small, with Canada showing a somewhat larger effect than Australia and New Zealand.
• With the possible exception of the very short end, Hong Kong shows no significant interest rate reaction to EMBI shocks. For Singapore, the reaction, if anything, is negative for both interest rates and exchange rates, consistent with a "safe haven" effect.
• The reation of Mexican and Argentinian interest rates to EMBI shocks are again very large, in the order of 2-2.5:1 at the short end. This time, the reaction of the Mexican CETES rate appears larger than that of the Argentinian PRE-1 rate, but the differences are not significant. The reaction of Mexico's exchange rate to a 1 percentage point shock EMBI shock is even larger than in the case of the daily VARs, with about a 2 percent depreciation in the first two months. For Chile, the reactions are also significant, but much smaller; Chile's interest rate pass through is about 0.3 for 1 compared with 2 for 1 for Argentina, and the depreciation is less than 0.5 percent following a 1 percent shock.
IV. CONCLUSIONS [EB to write]
A. Data sources
Daily data
Interest Rate Data:
• Argentina: (1) "Pre 1" , the interest rate on an Argentinean domestic peso-denominated bond (Source: Central Bank of Argentina). (2) 90 day interbank deposit rate, paid on deposits of more than 1 million pesos for a fixed time period (Source: Bloomberg); (3) 90 day deposit rate (Source: Datastream).
• Australia: 3 month bank bill rate, (Source: Datastream).
• Canada: 3 month treasury bill rate (Source: Datastream).
• Hong Kong: Hong Kong's 3 month interbank rate. This data was kindly provided to us by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA).
• Mexico: (1) 91-day CETES rate, a weekly auction rate determined in the primary market (Source: Datastream). (2) 91-day CETES rate determined daily in the secondary market (Source: Bloomberg). (3) 28-day CETES rate, determined daily in the secondary market (Source: Bloomberg).
• New Zealand: 3 month bank bill rate (Source: Datastream).
• Singapore: 3 month interbank rate (Source: Datastream).
• South Africa: 91 day treasury bill rate, a weekly auction rate. This data was kindly provided to us by the South African Reserve Bank.
Daily exchange rate data was downloaded from Datastream.
Emerging Market Bond Spread data was provided by JP Morgan.
US interest rate data was downloaded from Datastream. We use the Federal Funds Futures as an indicator of market's expectations of future US monetary policy. Given that the domestic interest rates we use have an horizon of 3 months, we use the Fed Futures rates with corresponding maturity. At the monthly frequency, we simply use the 2 months ahead futures. At the daily frequency however, we need to construct our own indicator. The traded contract is based on the average monthly federal funds rate for some given future month, so it changes discontinuously at the end of each calendar month. More precisely, let FF2(m,d) be the k-calendar months ahead futures rate at day d of month m. For instance, let m=1, and k=2 so that FF2 (1,d) is what the market expects, on day d of January, the average fed funds rate will be in March. Thus, FF2(1,1) is effectively a 3 months ahead expected rate, whereas FF2(1,31) is effectively a 2 months ahead rate. Moreover, between January 31 and February 1, the so called two months ahead rate jumps since FF2(1,31) refers to the expected rate for March whereas FF2(2,1) refers to April. To deal with those calendar effects, we construct a rate that is an average of the two and three calendar months ahead rates: on the first day of any given month, it is simply the FF2 rate and on the last day it is FF3. Between those two extremes, the weights vary linearly, so that the exact formula is:
FF2CONT has the two properties we were looking for: it has a constant horizon and it is "continuous" in m (in the sense that there are no spurious jumps at the end of the month).
It is possible to construct other well behaved rates, for instance by mixing FF3 and FF4. However, those rates happen to be extremely correlated and our results are insensitive to the particular choice, as long as the horizon we are considering is in line with the horizon of the domestic interest rate.
Missing Values. It turns out that EMBI and domestic interest rates series contain missing values at the daily frequency. Given the rich lag structure of the daily VARs, each missing value forced us to drop 10 observations. We therefore decided to interpolate the missing values by drawing a straight line between the previous and next non missing values. This amounts to replace 8,9,NA,11 by 8,9,10,11 for few observations. The point estimates are not affected, but of course the estimated standard errors become smaller (significantly smaller in the case of Mexico).
Sample exclusions.
When there is a presumption that the movements in EMBI is caused by events in one of our countries, we exclude the episode from our sample. Therefore, regressions involving Mexico start only in June 95, and those involving Honk Kong and Singapore do not include the period after July 97.
Monthly data
Monthly rate data for all countries was constructed by taking the average of the daily data for each month whenever daily data is available (that is, for Fed Funds Futures, EMBI, Exchange Rates and Interest Rates). CPI, money and industrial production data were taken from the IFS. When possible, we used seasonally adjusted data. In the case of Hong Kong, Mexico and Singapore, non-seasonally adjusted data was used.
For Hong Kong, industrial production data was not available on a monthly basis. At the suggestion of the HKMA, we used the monthly "orders-on-hand" (OOH) index as a proxy for industrial production. The monthly OOH index covers large and medium size establishments, i.e. those with at least 50 persons engaged. The OOH of small establishments is not included in the index; as such, it is an imperfect proxy of monthly industrial production.
B. Notes on Methodology
Exogeneity of US monetary Policy : for both the monthly and daily VARs, we test, accept and impose the condition that US interest rates are not affected by other variables in the VAR. This is clearly a non-controversial assumption, except for the case of the Russia/LTCM crisis. The point estimates of the impulse functions are not affected, but the restriction helps narrowing the error bands.
Daily VARs and impulse response functions:
All the impulse responses were constructed for 30 periods using 10 lags. The ordering of the vector autoregression (VAR) was as follows: i) FF2CONT (constructed 2-3 months ahead federal fund futures, see above for details), ii) EMBI (emerging market bonds spreads) iii) natural logarithm (ln) of the exchange rate iv) domestic interest rate. In the case of Argentina and Hong Kong, the VAR excludes the exchange rate. In the case of Canada, FF2CONT is the closing value of the day. For Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, it is lagged once. For Argentina and Mexico, we experimented with both and chose the lagged rate.
Monthly VARs and impulse response functions:
The monthly impulse responses were constructed for 24 periods using 4 lags. The ordering of the monthly VAR was as follows: i) 2 months ahead fed funds futures, ii) EMBI, iii) ln(money), iv) ln(industrial production) v) ln(CPI) vi) ln(exchange rate) vii) interest rate. As in the daily VAR, the exchange rate was excluded in the monthly VAR for Argentina and Hong Kong. 1/ Change in weighted average between 2-month ahead and three-month ahead federal funds futures rate (see Appendix). 2/ Unexpected change in the federal funds rate target, based on change in the current-month federal funds futures rate (see Kuttner 2000) .
Policy measure 1/ Change in weighted average between 2-month ahead and three-month ahead federal funds futures rate (see Appendix). 2/ Unexpected change in the federal funds rate target, based on change in the current-month federal funds futures rate (see Kuttner 2000) . 3/ Sample begins in July 1995. 
